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BOOK REVIEW
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE.

By Kent Greenawalt.

Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. 266. $29.95
REVIEWED BY TODD VOLKER*

On February 15, 1906, the Reverend Billy Sunday, the baseball
evangelist, shouted at and hectored a gathered crowd of 3,000 souls
in Princeton, Illinois.
According to a local newspaper:
Rev. Sunday preached on the ten commandments, and this
gave him the opportunity to talk about almost anything in
ethics, morals, religion, Christianity, wickedness, society, the
world in general, the United States especially, and Princeton
in particular. And he came near to doing all that in one
sermon which ran from honor to parents through race suicide
and graft to civic conditions in this city. He stood all over the
platform and gesticulated with his arms going like a wigwag
warning from a flagship.'
Evangelist's revivals, speeches in Congress, corner bar conversations and Fourth of July orations all share a similar tendency to
bridge religion and politics. Public occasions and public events are
not only forums for citizens dialogue but are also social affairs and
community events. This wall of separation slips and slides at times,
at times we wish it to stand firm, while at other times we wish it were
removed, or at least taken down somewhat to a level more satisfactory
to our beliefs.
Current political' philosophy on these matters works earnestly to
shore the wall. Writers such as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, David
Lyons and Bruce Ackerman have each defended a conception of
liberal politics which bans or excludes religion as a significant element
2
in the political life of a liberal democracy. John Rawls' magnificent
* B.A. 1985, Knox College; Mr. Volker is in the process of completing an
A.M. in Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Urbana, specializing in moral,
political and legal philosophy.
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work, A Theory of Justice, makes this prohibition quite clear. A
liberal democracy, says Rawls, depends on guards against the political
introduction of religious beliefs. In a recent article he wrote:
On the Kantian view that I shall present, conditions for
justifying a conception of justice holds only when a basis is
established for political reasoning and understanding within a
public culture. The social role of a conception of justice is to
enable all members of society to make mutually acceptable to
one another their shared institutions and basic arrangements,
by citing what are publicly recognized as sufficient reasons, as
identified by. that conception. To succeed in doing this, a
conception must specify admissible social institutions and their
possible arrangements into one system, so that they can be
justified to all citizens, whatever their social position or more
particular interests?
While Ronald Dworkin makes rather generous arguments supporting civil disobedience from moral or religious convictions, he
nevertheless believes that a liberal democracy can never incorporate
divergent claims to conscience in the political sphere.4 A correct
political decision in a liberal democracy could never permit political
consequences of a man's conscience, since this contravenes the principle of liberal equality.
Political decisions must be, so far as possible, independent of
any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives
value to life. Since the citizens of a society differ in their
conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if
it prefers one conception over another, either because the
officials believe that one is intrinsically superior, or because
one is held by the more numbers or more powerful group.'
Dworkin performs a good many contortionist's heroics to wriggle out
a distinction between "personal" and "external" preferences. 6
How many political questions, however, can be easily solved? Is
it truly possible to place such extreme reliance on man's rationality
and upon a sense of universalizable reason? To many, it seems as
though we can all peer deeply into political imbroglios, into tangles

PHY,

3. J. RAWLS, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,
Sept. 1980, at 517.
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4. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 222 (1977).
5. R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1988).
6. M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 135-47 (1982).
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of men and economics and ideals, and that with time and without
distraction, sure answers will arrive.
Yet there are at times differences so great that we may consider
them fundamental: a citizen's perspective on the metaphysical order
may well condition subsequent political choice. Many liberal theorists,
particularly Rawls, have been criticized for supplying their own metaphysical order to resolve these difficulties. In real-life politics, however, such constructs may be of small value. We need a practical way
to handle our differences.
Kent Greenawalt, Benjamin N. Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia University School of Law, has written a book on
the proper connection of religious beliefs to political decisions. In
Religious Convictions and Political Choice (Oxford University Press,
1988), Professor Greenawalt investigates contemporary political philosophy's great and protracted effort to separate the metaphysical
from the political realm.
Greenawalt quarterbacks an argument which must be heard.
Religious Convictions and Political Choice deserves its rightful place
alongside the work of Rawls and Dworkin and other liberal thinkers.
His book is likely to raise significant questions about the connection
of metaphysical beliefs and politics, perhaps to be addressed by later
theorists: the sort of questions which led Alasdair MacIntyre to
exclaim:
It is precisely because there is in our society no established
way of deciding between these claims that moral argument
appears to be necessarily interminable. From our rival conclusions we can argue back to our rival premises; but when we
do arrive at our premises argument ceases and the invocation
of one premise against another becomes a matter of pure
assertion and counter-assertion. Hence perhaps the slightly
shrill tone of so much moral debate.
But that shrillness may have an additional source. For it is not only
in arguments with others that we are reduced so quickly to assertion
and counter-assertion; it is also in the arguments We have within
ourselves .'
Religious Convictions and Political Choice is actually a book
working at two levels-one level is addressed to much of contemporary
liberal political philosophy, while the other level is directed to more
7. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 8

(2d rev. ed. 1981).
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substantive, real-world concerns. In doing this Professor Greenawalt
affirms, however slightly, a real need for comprehensive, philosophical
thought to be evident and working in our present legal system. Most
of the intractable problems we read about in newspapers, have heard
in candidates' speeches, or about which we have talked or shouted,
have, for Professor Greenawalt, a mutual origin, an uncertain birth,
in fundamental moral indeterminacy. The heart of Religious Convictions and PoliticalChoice rests in the argument that:
legislation must be justified in terms of secular objectives, but
when reasonable people think that shared premises of justice
and criteria for determining truth cannot resolve critical questions of fact . . . . or the weighing of competing benefits and
harms, they do appropriately rely on religious convictions that
help them answer these questions.'
Such fundamental questions of value are questions of moral
ontology-how we recognize and acknowledge morally relevant features in a situation, and what counts as morally relevant features of
a situation, in order to follow our usual effort at equity, at treating
like cases alike. We can't answer questions about the legal status of
human fetuses or animal rights, for instance, unless we have a
generally-shared demarcation of their ethical status. To some extent,
fetuses share morally relevant human features, and should be treated
as we treat everyone else. But then again, to some extent, they don't.
Answering questions of ethical status about fetuses ultimately relies
upon generally-shared interpretations of the morally relevant features
of fetuses, and these interpretations rest to some degree upon social
conventions and practices. Religious Convictions and PoliticalChoice
is a nice look into substantially broader philosophical questions: What
ultimately determines the source of value and meaning? How are
these determinations discussed and conveyed throughout society?
What constitutes meaning?
Arguments about judicial decision-making typically revolve around
two scenarios: a judge either strictly interprets the law, finding all
answers already existing within the law itself; or is understood to be
actually making the law in rare cases when the law is indeterminate.
Professor Greenawalt's work has some relevance in this debate because
he recognizes the imperative facing judges-they must often resolve
critical questions of legal and even moral indeterminacy.
8. K.

[hereinafter

GREENAWALT,

RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE

RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS].

(1988)
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Religious Convictions and Political Choice is useful to the debate
over judicial decision-making, since it explains rather well the reality
of indeterminate choices, and some of these hard choices are faced in
the judiciary:
[b]oth because of the indeterminacy of community opinion
and because their task is to sometimes decide by themselves
what is right, judges will occasionally have to decide what is
a correct answer to an issue of moral and political philosoI see no escape from the proposition that the judge,
phy ....
like the legislator, may in such settings find it necessary to
rely on his religiously informed answers to what is right .... 9
Taking this quite fundamental indeterminacy as his starting point,
Professor Greenawalt shows his readers that many of the problems
surrounding us are but compounding reflections of this most elemental, ontological confusion. Problems such as abortion, animal rights,
environmental protection, and welfare rights all ask finally for a
resolution which is both ethical and widely-shared. Without such
social consensus on the weight and arrangement of values in these
problems, no appropriate legislation or judicial decision can be made.
Professor Greenawalt's view on abortion is quite instructive here,
for it shows the way this argument is used throughout the examples
in his book. The various arguments often used to support abortion
are explored. Against the common argument that a woman's right to
control her body permits her to have an abortion, Greenawalt rather
well disagrees:
In ordinary pregnancy, the woman is something other than an
unwilling victim and a more complicated analysis of her
responsibility is needed. If she has voluntarily performed an
act, sexual intercourse, that she is aware carries some risk of
pregnancy, she bears 0 some degree of responsibility for the
creation of the fetus.'
Another position, that enforcing a law in the face of massive noncompliance is inappropriate, is defused. If at least some enforcement
could save at least some lives, the enforcement is a positive good.
Both of the above counter-examples to popular positions allowing
abortion rely upon the idea of the fetus as a complete human being.
9. Id. at 214. See also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961);
DWORKIN, TAKING RiGHTs SERIOUSLY (1977).
10.

RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS,

supra note 8, at 123.
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Many dispute this claim and argue for a different reading of the
moral status of the fetus. Two different and incompatible visions
exist. One reading follows a utilitarian and consequentialist direction-all that really matters in moral evaluation is present capacity.
This principle, however, is refuted by an Aristotelian view of human
development which understands fetuses to be potential human beings,
and to have a particular moral worth on this accord. The second
likely position is a traditional rights-based, deontological position. All
human beings have individual rights, and moral worth because of
these rights. This view is again rebuked by an Aristotelian view, as
well as by daily evidence around us: human beings differ in their
moral capacities. Infants rarely vote. Senile persons and comatose
patients rarely argue cases in court.
Greenawalt's summation is that "our society lacks any shared
decisive moral principle that establishes when an entity will grow into
an ordinary human being deserves some protection, and rational
thought may be incapable of settling upon one among the plausible
candidates." " The moral indeterminacy that exists here parallels the
present general philosophical indeterminacy between rights-based and
utilitarian theories. Finding the intellectual resources to answer definitional questions about abortion in the midst of this indeterminacy
is impossible: what Greenawalt terms "publicly accessible reasons"
give out. In such an instance reliance may be appropriately made, in
a liberal democracy, upon religious convictions.
Professor Greenawalt, noting the demands of law for accuracy
and for clear and clean distinctions, wishes to find a precise answer.
Says Greenawalt:
My own personal positions, based on complicated grounds
including the appropriate role of courts in interpreting the
Constitution, are that Roe v. Wade, the case establishing a
woman's general constitutional right to an abortion, was
wrongly decided, but that, were they free to decide, legislatures
should adopt a permissive approach to abortion, that a constitutional amendment requiring restrictive laws would be
gravely misconceived, and that even an amendment allowing
2
such laws would be undesirable.
The chief theoretical element in Religious Convictions and Political Choice is Professor Greenawalt's main contention that publicly
11. Id. at 126.
12. Id. at 120.
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accessible reasons and values may run out at times, and may not
provide answers to hard choices among various possible moral determinations. In a quandary, we may with certain qualifications, adopted
to insure the values of a liberal order, rely on reasons not generally
shared throughout society. This position stands in recognized contrast
to other liberal theorist's views. Bruce Ackerman presents a bareboned
statement of the liberal position: "Nobody has the right to vindicate
political authority by asserting a privileged insight into the moral
3
universe which is denied to the rest of us."' Ackerman's position
clearly rings in the same key as John Rawls' and Ronald Dworkin's
positions.
Where much present communitarian criticism of liberalism, for
example, the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel,
forcefully tears into liberalism's self-conscious exclusion of religious
or other metaphysical premises; Kent Greenawalt's position is an
effort to mitigate liberalism's stubborn divide. If certain questions are
not resolvable by his highly democratic scheme, even greater questions
should be raised about liberalism.
Professor Greenawalt, for his part, does not question the logic
of liberalism. He accepts liberalism because, in his words, "I am
mainly interested in what one can fairly expect of religious citizens 'if4
one accepts the premises that underlie our political institutions.'
What is engaging in Professor Greenawalt's work is exactly this
concern for real-life institutions and flesh-and-blood human beings.
His last book, published in 1987, Conflicts of Law and Morality, was
a concerted effort to take many of the grand arguments of contemporary legal philosophers and fashion them into solutions practically
useful to those involved throughout the legal system. In the course of
this project, Greenawalt noted the difficulties with rights-based, deontological and utilitarian theories, and offered a mitigating device in
the use of the General Justification Defense. His discussion of the
grounds for reliance upon religious premises in his present work
resembles his position taken on the General Justification Defense. In
both instances, Greenawalt argues that established rules should generally be followed, except in certain cases when these rules no longer
5
seem applicable, due to novel circumstances.'

13. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-11 (1980).
14. RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 8, at 123.
15. K. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 272 (1987) (examples

include breaking the speed limit to save a life, or blocking traffic to protest a
dangerous failure to install a traffic light).
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Criticisms of Greenawalt's latest book must begin with how he
describes the political forum, the public arena of reason, and the
limitations of this forum, and of public reasons themselves. If Professor Greenawalt's descriptions of these can be de-railed, more
general destruction of his position is inevitable.
The arguments opposing Greenawalt's thesis are capably explained and presented even within Religious Convictions and Political
Choice. Greenawalt must fight off these challenges: (a) that publicly
accessible reasons are not really inconclusive; (b) religious premises
are relevantly shut off from the public forum, and must be used only
in private choices; (c) only an implicit and general reliance on religious
premises is acceptable, if supported by consensus; and (e) publicly
accessible reasons take priority in conflict with religious premises.1 6
How Professor Greenawalt matches these challenges and marshalls arguments against them is without question the highlight of his
book. Each of these positions is quite powerful, with its own strength
and support. What is apparent is that each tends to ignore certain
17
"inherent limitations of reasoned discourse."
Some of Greenawalt's concern to admit religious premises in a
liberal order, stems from his recognition of what may be called a
"natural necessity" argument about politics and human society, and
a sense of human personality presently epitomized in the works of
communitarian critics of liberalism.
The first concern I label follows H.L.A. Hart's use of the term
"natural necessity" to describe the invariant features of human society
which must of necessity be accommodated by law. This appreciation
is a practical appreciation of human life. Professor Greenawalt's
"natural necessity" concern here is mainly that people cannot philosophize all day upon political moves. Moral authorities may rightly be
consulted for ethical guidance, but are only justifiably consulted if
the authorities have been reasonably correct in the past. For as he
notes, "it is rational to accept the judgments of people who are
established as experts by criteria of training, experience, and peer
recognition, and to accept the judgments of those who have proven
right in the past."" s As Greenawalt concludes, "[n]o sensible model
of how citizens and officials should make political decisions can
exclude such possible reliance on 'moral authority."' 19

16.
17.
18.
19.

RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 8,at 145.

Id. at 151.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
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245

However reasonable, this caveat has few liberal overtones. According to John Stuart Mill, the source of much recent guidance for
liberal theorists: "he who lets the world, or his own portion of it,
choose his plan of life for him has no need of any faculty other than
the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself
20
employs all his faculties." Mill's position here is that reliance on
moral authority subverts a democratic process in which the clash and
electric calamity of competing views will eventually provide an incandescent spark of the truth. Those who attempt to suppress an opinion
are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind and exclude every other person from the
means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion because
they are sure that it is false is to assume that their certainty is
the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion
21
is an assumption of infallibility.
Professor Greenawalt's second concern has to do with a conception of moral personality. People simply should be allowed to rely
upon their religious views in difficult choices because they are integral
to their life and constitutive of their essential character. Greenawalt's
position here is that:
[Mly argument is based on simple notions of fairness and
tolerance for diverse beliefs and on what can reasonably be
expected of people with deep religious convictions, the holding
of which has never been assumed to disqualify someone from
being a good liberal citizen. If all people must draw from their
personal experiences and commitments of value to some degree, people whose experience leads them to religious convictions should not have to disregard what they consider 22the
provide.
critical insights about value that their convictions
This urge to bring liberalism to reconcile its demand for strict
neutrality with human individuality is a mature desire in Religious
Convictions and Political Choice. A theory predicated upon human
rights as the sole concern and end of government is blind to the good
of social union, to the fact that men and women conceive of society
as working toward mutual goals. A liberalism with a strict deontological orientation strips individuals of many of the relevant particulars
20. J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 71 (1956).
21. Id. at 21-22.
22. RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 8, at 144-145.
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of human existence-race, sex, age, intellectual capacity, creed-and
brings a uniformity of circumstances which may bring theoretical
consistency, to be sure, although not much identification is left with
ordinary life and people.
Kent Greenawalt is concerned about the constitutionality of
reliance upon religious premises, and points out that his is an attempt
to present a model of good liberal citizenship. Such citizenship, in a
social union characterized by individualism and rationalism, must be
consistent with liberal tenets, and, of course, must also be constitutional. A model liberal citizen will rely on publicly accessible reasons
for political choices and decisions. To use religion to usurp our
commonly available forms of reasoning confounds a truly liberal
order. Reliance on religious premises must follow when all other
public reasons fail. Religiously informed ethical decisions are inapt,
Professor Greenawalt says, only if (1) the religious convictions themselves are wrong; or (2) they replicate decisions found by other means
consistent with liberal democracy; or (3) they are disqualified by some
aspect of liberal democracy or its underlying principles.23
The relation of reason to religious guidance is crucially important,
and a good portion of Religious Convictions and Political Choice
discusses how people have viewed the relationship. Some argue what
I think is the extreme position that reason can resolve everything, and
clear up all darkness like a candelabra in a coal mine. Others have
taken the opposite view, and argue that reason is a part of the
foolishness of man, and have said that divine inspiration, manifested
in revelations, supersedes any human knowledge. Somewhere between
the grandiose optimism and spectacular pessimism of these views lies
a sensible position.
Professor Greenawalt makes it clear that a liberal democracy
relies upon religious tolerance-particularly among public officials.
Some legal scholars may make arguments about the constitutionality
of official reliance upon religious convictions in the execution of their
public duties, but Professor Greenawalt finds problems with this
understanding of the relation between the Constitution and public
officials. Officials may rely on religious convictions when confronted
with basic indeterminacy. Legislators and judges are not duty-bound
and sworn to deny constituent judgments informed by religious reasons consonant with liberalism, although much hinges on the depth
24
of civic consensus.

23. Id. at 30.
24. Id. at 235-7.
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The judgments of officials themselves, says Greenawalt, should
hold to an ideal of nonreliance upon religious premises, although such
an ideal seems impossible to fully grasp. "If a model of liberal
democracy has nominal regard for that wholeness and integrity of
religious persons, it cannot expect legislators, any more than private
individuals, systematically to expunge all religious convictions as a
guide to action." 25 Yet a legislator must consider his constituency,
and "should be very hesitant to proceed on his religious convictions
views are opposed to the political
when he believes that constituent
' 26
yield.
position his convictions
Professor Greenawalt's discussion of unconstitutional reliance on
religious premises places weight on the principle of nonsponsorship.
At this point, Greenawalt adopts a position based upon John Stuart
Mill's "harm principle":
The basic claim . . . is that to demand that other people act
in accord with dominant religious beliefs is to promote or
When the
impose these beliefs in an impermissible way ....
this
harm,
acts that the law forbids cause no ascertainable
kind of imposition should be regarded 27as amounting to their
establishment in a constitutional sense.
Use of the First Amendment, then, plays largely here, as well as
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process provisions. Professor Greenawalt takes the due process argument to be more than
procedural, since there must be limitations on the kinds of reasons
allowable under due process. He cites the dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick28 as an example of a "a due process principle that some
' 29 In this case,
harm to secular interests must underlie prohibitions.
Justice Blackmun argued that "the legitimacy of secular legislation
depends ... on whether the State can advance some justification for
30
its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine."
Congruent with the rest of his position in Religious Convictions
and Political Choice, Greenawalt notes:
a law should not be treated as unconstitutional if the place of
religious convictions or personal intuitions is to define the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 237.
Id.
Id. at 247.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 8, at 249.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 9

entities that warrant protection or to help resolve questions of
fact or conflicts of value when the critical problem is not one
that shared premises and common forms of reasoning can
resolve. 3
I think a minor problem with Religious Convictions and Political
Choice lies in its reliance upon a rather conventional view of religion;
a sense of religion with a mainline sensibility; religion that is respectful
or even appreciative of the values of a liberal political order.
Alexis de Tocqueville's observations on religious institutions in America seem rather germane here. "In the United States no religious
doctrine displays the slightest hostility to democratic and republican
institutions. The clergy of all the different sects there hold the same
language; their opinions are in agreement with the laws, and the
human mind flows onward, so to speak, in one individual current." 32
With a different sense of religion, perhaps one with a more global
sense of the place of religion in everyday life, much of Religious
Convictions and Political Choice may require serious revision. One
wonders how an Islamic fundamentalist, or even a Christian fundamentalist, would view the tapestry of Greenawalt's argument. But
such a revision would not be at the hand of a liberal democrat.
Greenawalt's own side discussions about Roman Catholicism suggest
the difficulty of reconciling a liberal order with an all-embracing
religious order. Rousseau's famous answer, in the end, was to raze
the wall of separation and to combine government and religion, to be
establishmentarian, and to ostracize atheists and nonbelievers. 3" In a
sense, Religious Convictions and PoliticalChoice presents a version
of liberal establishmentarianism because of its liberal definition of
religion.
Greenawalt's work is a demonstration of the relation between
religious belief and political reason-a relationship pointedly avoided
by many politicians and political actors. Further criticism of ReligiousConvictions and Political Choice may be directed at how Professor
Greenawalt says we are to rely upon religious premises, for Greenawalt
himself observes the distinction between the metaphysical and the
political is exceptionally hard to draw.14 The differentiation in human
life characteristic of modern political philosophy-where art is estranged from science, religion separated from politics-wholly coin31. RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 8, at 250.
32. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 312-13 (1945).
33. J. ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 103 (1983).
34. RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 8, at 31.
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cides with the rise of liberalism. There is little surprise in noting that
John Locke's works arose in opposition to Sir Richard Filmer's
35
writings on the divine right of kings. On one hand, Greenawalt has
to preserve these distinctions in order to fulfill the barest requirements
of liberalism; yet on the other hand, he must admit some interaction,
albeit with great qualification, because, as he notes, religion plays a
great part in the moral lives of citizens. Where Walzer simply acknowledges the fragmentation in human life and plays along with itfinding a relevant sense of justice, different key, same tune, in each
sphere of human activity; 36 where Rawls' contractors in the original
position swear their allegiance to prior decisions of disembodied,
generic persons;3 7 Greenawalt tries to bridge religion and liberal
politics by admitting to the need for religion's moral impetus, albeit
in liberal terms. Religious reasons must take an inferior position to
publicly accessible reasons, then, and are used only when these
superior reasons fade. Religious reasons for political decisions are
acceptable only when publicly accessible reasonings do not bring
common solutions-and only then is there recourse to religious reasons.
Professor Greenawalt here implicitly suggests that religion has
anti-liberal tendencies, in the end, because religious experiences are
often highly personal, a result of one's own experiences and condi3
tions, and not too likely to be shared fully with everyone. " The words
to his conclusion presents the resonance of his arguments in full
concord:
I began my investigation of this subject with a belief that the
claim that citizens and legislators should rely exclusively on
secular grounds was definitely wrong. I have found it more
difficult than I initially supposed to show that the claim is
definitely wrong, but increasing familiarity has persuaded me
that at the deepest level the claim is not only wrong but
absurd. It invites religious persons to displace their most firmly
rooted convictions about values and about the nature of
humanity and the universe in a quest for common bases of
judgment that is inevitably unavailing when virtually everyone
must rely on personal perspectives. The product of serious
efforts by religious people to be model liberal citizens of the
35. See generally J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1966).
36. See generally M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
37. See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
38. RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 8, at 73.
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sort recommended would necessitate a frustrating alienation
of their whole persons from their political characters. Rather
than asserting any exclusivity for nonreligious reasoned judgement, sensible thought about a model of liberal democracy
focuses mainly on domains of liberty and a more constrained
commitment to shared premises and forms of reason.
Perhaps the most important lesson of this entire exercise is that
liberalism demands a high degree of tolerance, not the tolerance of
indifference, but the tolerance of a sympathetic mutual understanding
of the place that religious premises occupy in the life of serious
believers and of the dangers to those of different beliefs if religious
convictions and discourse overwhelms the common dialogue of rational secular morality. 9

39. Id. at 258.

